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Abstract:  
In this paper, we investigate both short- and long-term impacts of financial stimuli on public 
goods provision when contributions are tied to individual harm-related behavior. We conduct 
a large-scaled field experiment to examine voluntary contributions to a carbon offsetting 
program during the online purchase of a bus ticket. We systematically vary the individual 
payoff structure by introducing different matching grants (1/3:1, 1:1, 3:1) and price rebates 
(r-25%, r-50%, r-75%). Our results show that price rebates are more effective than matching 
schemes in raising participation rates while matching grants induce higher contributions to the 
offsetting program. We suspect differences in the personal responsibility for the compensated 
emissions to drive this result. Analyzing repeated bookings, we find decreasing treatment 
effects for returning customers except for the case of 1:1 matching grants. The equal matching 
scheme is also the only intervention that increases net contributions of customers compared to 
the control group. 
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1. Introduction 
How can we stimulate voluntary contributions to public goods? So far, most experimental and 
empirical investigations have focused on the provision of pure public goods like donations to 
charities. Voluntary contributions to public goods are, however, increasingly attached to 
conventional private goods. Individuals therefore often take a joint decision on both the 
consumption of the private and the contribution to the public good. Typical examples include 
donations to providers of open-source software or green goods which explicitly tie public 
goods contributions to individual harm-related behavior.  
As one of the most prominent green goods, carbon offsetting programs provide the 
opportunity to reduce pollution externalities and therefore mitigate own contributions to a 
public bad (Kotchen 2009). Recent empirical and experimental investigations confirm a 
positive relationship between the personal perception of individual impacts on climate 
change, e.g. for detrimental carbon emissions, and the willingness to contribute to climate 
protection (Löschel et al. 2013a, Diederich and Goeschl 2014). Individual contributions to a 
public good in the presence of own disamenities may therefore deviate from unrelated pure 
donations. In particular, it is unclear how financial stimuli such as price rebates or matching 
grants, having been shown to successfully enhance the provision of pure public goods (e.g., 
Karlan and List 2007, Meier 2007, Eckel and Grossman 2008), affect contributions in joint 
decisions on both goods. 
In this paper, we examine repeated contributions to a public good that are explicitly tied to the 
harm-related consumption of a private good. We study carbon offsetting behavior in a large-
scaled field experiment within the German long-distance bus market. Thereby, we 
systematically vary the individual payoff structure by introducing different financial stimuli in 
a randomized controlled trial. In particular, we offer different discounts by introducing either 
a price rebate on carbon offsets of 25% (r-25%), of 50% (r-50%) or 75% (r-75%). In addition, 
we consider different matching schemes that multiply contributions of the participants at a 
specific rate. We differentiate between matching rates of 1/3:1 (1/3 kg of CO2 added for every 
kg offset by the customer), 1:1 and 3:1. Our design therefore enables us both to compare the 
impact of these stimuli in contrast to the control group and to study how their intensity affects 
decision behavior. Moreover, using data on returning customers, we investigate the dynamic 
effects of the different stimuli, both while treatments were in place as well as for the time 
after treatment removal.  
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Previous field studies based on pure public goods like charitable giving decisions found both 
matching grants (Karlan and List 2007, Meier 2007) and price rebates (Eckel and Grossman 
2008) to increase donations. In these studies, matching grants were more effective than 
rebates. Our analysis, based on a contribution decision being related to individual harm-
related behavior and not based on a pure donation decision, delivers a more diverse picture: 
While all price rebate schemes increase participation rates in contrast to the baseline scenario, 
we find weaker effects for matching grants when focusing on first booking decisions. In terms 
of treatment intensity, we report modest price sensitivity with diminishing marginal effects for 
large interventions. In line with experimental findings from charitable donations by Karlan 
and List (2007), large match ratios (3:1) do not have any additional impact on participation 
rates, relative to smaller match ratios (1:1). Moreover, we also report similar results for 
rebates, where a rebate of 75% does not attract more customers than a 50% discount. In the 
dynamic analysis, we show that the effects of matching grants and price rebates on offsetting 
behavior decrease over time while they remain constant only for the equal (1:1) matching 
grants. This trend even persists after treatment removal, as 1:1 matching is the only treatment 
with long-term spill-overs. The equal matching scheme is also the only mechanism being able 
to significantly increase the net contributions of customers in contrast to the control group. 
Investigating the dynamics for repeated booking decisions suggests price rebates to rather 
serve as an instrument to advertise the carbon offsetting program among first customers, 
while 1:1 matching schemes appear to be more likely to stimulate the long-term involvement 
of returning customers.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview on the 
relevant literature and summarizes empirical findings from charitable giving experiments and 
other related studies. Section 3 provides a short introduction to the long-distance bus market 
and describes the experimental design. We present and discuss our results in section 4, before 
concluding in the last section. 
2. Related Literature 
So far, field experimental methods on public goods provision have mainly focused on 
charitable giving. They investigate the impact of different donation mechanisms and 
institutional settings, including challenge gifts, matching grants, price rebates and social 
information. 
Karlan and List (2007) study the impact of matching grants on donation behavior based on 
mail solicitations to 50,000 prior donors of a nonprofit organization in the US. They report 
2 
that matching increases both the probability to donate (+22%) and the revenue per solicitation 
(+19%) in contrast to the control group. Interestingly, their results suggest that larger match 
ratios (2:1 and 3:1) (in USD) do not have any additional impact on donation behavior in 
contrast to smaller matching rates (1:1). Rondeau and List (2008) investigate matching grants 
(1:1) in the presence of a threshold and a money-back guarantee in case the threshold is not 
reached. They do not find a significant difference between the matching treatment and a 
baseline scenario which may be due to the small sample size. Meier (2007) analyzes matching 
rates below 1:1 (1/4:1 and 1/2:1). The propensity to donate increases by six percentage points 
in the 50%-match while the effect of the 25%-match was smaller and not significant. Meier 
(2007) also provides the only long-run analyses of these interventions. He observes donors 
after the matching schemes were removed and finds negative effects for the year after the 
intervention and neutral effects when comparing matching and baseline over four points in 
time, including the time of intervention. Similar to our design, Eckel and Grossman (2008) set 
up a field experiment that allows the comparison of matching grants and price rebates. They 
use two pairs with identical relative price (1/4:1 vs. r-20% and 1/3:1 vs. r-25%) and report 
matching grants to lead to higher donations than price rebates. Anik et al. (2014) test a 
modified matching scheme for encouraging contributors to a charitable giving website to 
upgrade from single donations to recurring monthly donations. In addition to a standard 1:1 
match, they consider a set of contingent matching rates informing donors that the charity will 
match (1:1) all donations made the same day but only if 25% (50%,75%) of all participants 
agree to upgrade. Their results suggest a 75%-contingent match to be most effective in terms 
of average individual donations and recurring donations (4.7% of all participants). A possible 
explanation for this finding is that a 75%-contingent matching scheme provides both social 
proof and a high likelihood that the threshold will be achieved. 
The existing literature on charitable giving does not provide a comprehensive experimental 
design which simultaneously investigates both different rebate and matching schemes (below 
and above 1:1). Moreover, there is only little experimental evidence on long-term effects of 
matching schemes on donation behavior. Most importantly, none of these studies investigates 
the effect of price rebates on returning donators.  
We are aware of only few field experimental investigations that address voluntary carbon 
offsets. To our knowledge, none of these studies considers rebates and matching schemes. 
Araña and León (2012) observe participation in a CO2 offsetting program among air travelers 
to attend conventions and conferences in Gran Canaria during a time span of two years. They 
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consider both different default settings (opt-in vs. opt-out) and offsetting prices (€10, €20, 
€40, €60). Based on 1,680 observations, the results suggest acceptance rates to decrease in 
prices irrespective of the frame of the default option. For small prices, participation is higher 
if the offsetting program is framed as willingness to withdraw from the program (opt-out) 
than as if it is modeled as a willingness to pay (WTP) for the program. The mean WTP for 
one ton of CO2 corresponds to €39.82 in the opt-out frame and to €25.91 in the opt-in frame. 
Löfgren et al. (2012) conduct a similar experiment on CO2 offsetting behavior among air 
travelling attendances at an environmental conference. While offsetting prices are fixed (€10 
for participants from within Europe and €40 for those flying from outside Europe) they 
consider three different pre-default options (opt-in, opt-out, active choice). Highest 
participation rates were obtained in the active choice treatment (46.8%), followed by the opt-
out (43.2%) and the opt-in treatments (39.3%) but no differences appeared to be significant in 
the sample. Compensation rates from flights within Europe (53.2%) are significantly higher 
than those from flights from outside Europe (24.4%). Based on these findings, they conclude 
that the effect of default options serving as nudges to affect decision behavior attenuates with 
market experience. Further survey-based investigations by Brouwer et al. (2008) among air 
travel passengers at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport indicate three quarters of all passengers to 
be willing to pay an additional carbon travel tax to the current price of the airplane ticket 
while acceptance rates are highest among European and lowest among Asian travelers. 
A further strand of the related (framed) field experimental literature on public goods provision 
investigates acceptable cost levels and the willingness to pay to avoid negative consequences 
of climate change (Löschel et al. 2013a,b, Diederich and Goeschl 2014). However, in these 
experiments, subjects did not take part in a carbon offsetting program where contributions 
were explicitly tied to individual harm-related behavior. Instead, individuals faced the 
opportunity to purchase their desired amount of carbon allowances which were then 
withdrawn from the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. These studies suggest that 
contribution decisions to public goods may vary if they are tied to harm-related behavior. This 
certainly depends on the individual perception of the underlying harmful behavior. Löschel et 
al. (2013a) report two third of their experimental subjects to believe that individual behavior 
influences climate change. In line with this finding, Diederich and Goeschl (2014) confirm a 
positive relationship between the perception of acknowledged lifestyle impacts on climate 
change and the willingness to pay for climate protection. Similarly, based on data from web 
interviews among driver’s license holders from the U.S and Germany, Lange and Ziegler 
(2012) find agents with a higher feeling of responsibility for carbon emissions to be more 
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likely to state their willingness to pay for voluntary carbon offsets. There is only limited data 
available on participation rates in offsetting programs being regularly in place. Take-up rates 
in the aviation sector are, however, expected to be rather in the single digits (Greenair 2011).1 
3. The field experiment 
3.1. The offsetting program 
In January 2013, Germany lifted its ban on long-distance bus operations. An amendment to 
the German Passenger Transportation Act (Personenbeförderungsgesetz, PBefG) ended the 
existing interdiction of additional scheduled national transport services if a corresponding 
railway service was already established (e.g., BMVIT 2013).2 Since the deregulation in 2013, 
the long-distance bus market has been expanded rapidly. About 40 bus companies are 
currently operating on the highly fragmented market (IGES 2013). By the end of 2013, 
weekly scheduled national trips have tripled compared to the beginning of the year. Within 
the same time period, bus operators established 76 additional regular routes (+123%). 
Similarly, transport volume increased by 12.5% to 1.3 million passengers within the first half 
of 2013 compared to 2012, while passenger railway transport decreased by 1.2% to 63 million 
(DESTATIS 2013). 
For conducting our field experiment, we collaborated with one of the pioneering bus operators 
that entered the market in January 2013. The company did not offer or participate in any 
carbon offsetting program before the experiment was launched in October 2013. We 
introduced the program without any advertising or pre-announcement. It was designed to be a 
part of the usual online booking system at the company’s official website. The booking 
system allows buying either one-way or return tickets, for up to four passengers at a time. 
After passengers had chosen their individual trips, the possibility to offset carbon emissions 
was offered in neutral words, including price and amount (in kilograms of CO2) of the 
compensation. 
Based on individual carbon emissions of 47g CO2 per passenger kilometer3 and a price of 
17.90 € per ton CO2 charged by the collaborating offsetting provider, offsets were sold at 8 
cents (in €) per 100 passenger kilometer. Passengers were required to make a binary choice by 
clicking either “yes” or “no”. They also had the opportunity to obtain detailed information on 
1 Quantas (2010) reports that 7.5% to 9% of their online customers offset their carbon emissions in 2009/2010 resulting in a total volume of 
240,000 tons of CO2. 
2 The ban dated back to 1935 and was initially introduced to ensure profitability of public railway passenger services due to high investment 
costs for railway infrastructure. Note that the liberalization only covers the long-distance market. 
3 Carbon emissions include both direct carbon emissions from fuel consumption (39g CO2/km) and the life-cycle-assessment for the vehicle 
based on the GEMIS database (IINAS 2013). 
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the offsetting program on request. Therefore, we are able to detect whether learning about the 
specific offsetting project is associated with differences in offsetting behavior.4 After making 
their decision, passengers received a list of the items they intended to buy (including their 
offsetting expenses), were asked to give personal information (no additional information 
beyond the usual booking process was asked) and to enter payment details. 
Questionnaire data collected after the experiment suggest the vast majority of passengers to be 
between 16 and 35 years old and most of them to have an academic background. Men and 
women are equally represented.5 
3.2. Experimental design and procedure 
We introduced different interventions to the offsetting program in three subsequent stages 
(see Figure A1). In stage 1, which also coincided with the introduction of the carbon 
offsetting program, we varied informational settings holding relative prices and amounts 
constant. In stage 2, matching grants and price rebates were introduced holding the 
informational setting constant. Finally, in stage 3 we reproduced the conditions from stage 1 
with the aim to study decision behavior over time. After the end of stage 3, the offsetting 
program continued to exist in a fixed setting. In this paper, we focus on the interventions in 
stage 2. 
To study the effects of price rebates and matching schemes on offsetting behavior, we ran a 
baseline condition and six treatments where we varied the incentives keeping wording and the 
general framework as similar as possible. Both types of subsidies were communicated as a 
temporal offer given by the bus company to support individual offsetting contributions: 
rebates directly reduced the passenger’s offsetting price while matching grants resulted in 
additional carbon offsets being paid by the company (see translated screenshots in Figure A2). 
In particular, we considered three levels of price rebates reducing the costs for offsets by 25%, 
50% and 75% (r-25%, r-50%, r-75%), and equivalent matching grants (1/3:1, 1:1, 3:1).  
It should be noted that the price per unit CO2 is identical in r-50% and 1:1 (8.95 €/t CO2) 
while the amount of CO2 covered in 1:1 is twice as high as in r-50%. Similar considerations 
hold for   r-25% and 1/3:1 (13.45 €/t CO2), and r-75% and 3:1 (4.50 €/t CO2) respectively. In 
contrast to many experimental settings on charitable donations, in our experiment individuals 
4 Those interested were informed that contributions were used to support an energy efficiency project in the public sector dealing with 
improved household charcoal stoves in Accra/Ghana and that greenhouse gas emissions reductions within this project were certified under a 
voluntary certification process (VER) and labelled as a Gold Standard project that is considered to be the most rigorous international 
certification benchmark for quality and compliance of carbon offsetting programs (see http://www.goldstandard.org/ for more information, 
access on January 10, 2014). 
5 Questionnaires were distributed both in the bus of the collaborating operator, during randomly determined bus rides, and online, using the 
operator’s email list of customers, yielding 403 observations. 
6 
                                                     
did not have the opportunity to adjust their contribution levels independently but had a binary 
choice. Emission quantities were derived from the underlying trip and individuals did not 
have the possibility to independently determine their own contribution given the respective 
rebate or matching scheme. The total amount of CO2 that can be offset is therefore always 
higher in the matching treatments than in the price rebate schemes. The effect of price rebates 
and matching schemes with the same price per unit CO2 are therefore not assumed to be 
equivalent in our case. 
Treatments assignment was based on a randomly generated number that was saved as a 
browser cookie (ID) on the individuals’ computers when entering the website for the first 
time. If individuals interrupted the booking process, returned to the website later and the 
cookie was not deleted, they remained within the same treatment. This randomization strategy 
allows us to investigate repeated bookings of returning customers during the entire 
experiment.6 
4. Experimental results 
We recorded 11,258 bookings in seven conditions, including both single- and multi-trip 
bookings.7 For the analysis in the paper, we exclude IDs that had been already faced with an 
offsetting decision in phase 1 (5.2%). Our results are therefore based on 10,623 booking 
decisions. 
Observations are fairly equally distributed across treatments with about 1,500 observations in 
each setting (see Table 1 for an overview). The mean travel distance is 274 km resulting in 
individual CO2 emissions of 12.9 kg per booking. Travelers face an average hypothetical 
offsetting price of 0.23 € which accounts for about 1.0% of the average total ticket price per 
booking.  
Throughout the experiment we observe multiple bookings for about a quarter of all 
participants. We start our analysis by focusing on the first booking per ID (sections 4.1 - 4.3) 
and then extend the discussion to all bookings to study long-term effects (section 4.4). As 
offsets are offered in different combinations of prices and quantities, we study effects on both 
participation rates and on contribution levels.  
 
 
 
6 If the individual browser settings had cleared cookies in the meanwhile individuals were randomly reassigned.  
7 In about 36% of all bookings more than one trip is purchased leading to a higher number of trips than bookings in the aggregate. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of the experimental design (per booking)  
Treatment control 1:1 r-50% 3:1 r-75% 1/3:1 r-25% all 
bookings per ID  1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 
distance (km) 267.8 276.4 274.7 273.6 276.1 270.6 278.2 273.9 
CO2 (kg) 12.6 13.0 12.9 12.9 13.0 12.7 13.1 12.9 
CO2 per trip (kg) 8.7 8.7 8.8 8.7 8.8 8.7 8.7 8.7 
totalCO2 per trip (incl. matches, kg) 8.7 17.5 8.8 34.7 8.8 11.5 8.7 14.2 
ticketprice (excl. offsetting cost, €) 18.3 18.8 18.4 18.7 18.6 18.3 18.7 18.5 
relative price (% of total booking) 1.3 1.3 0.6 1.3 0.3 1.3 1.0 1.0 
voucher (%) 1.9 2.3 2.6 2.4 2.4 1.7 1.5 2.1 
info button request (%) 2.3 0.9 1.6 1.2 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.5 
return ticket (%) 28.6 30.4 29.8 30.6 30.7 29.3 32.0 30.2 
group ticket (%) 9.7 9.4 9.5 9.1 10.6 9.2 9.5 9.6 
female (%) 52.8 53.5 53.9 50.7 53.9 56.3 53.4 53.5 
carbon price (€/t CO2) 17.9 8.95 8.95 4.5 4.5 13.45 13.45 10.26 
Observations 1,542 1,463 1,522 1,557 1,496 1,557 1,486 10,623 
 
4.1. Participation 
In this section, we analyze treatment effects with respect to the probability of taking part in 
the offsetting program, measured as the binary variable participation. The average 
participation rate for first bookers is 30.8% (Table 2). Take-up rates in the different rebate 
conditions amount to 30.6% (r-25%), 35.7% (r-50%), and 36.2% (r-75%) while they are 
26.2% (1/3:1), 30.8% (1:1) and 29.1% (3:1) in the matching schemes. Except for 1/3:1 
matching, participation in all treatments is higher than in the control group (27.0%) (see also  
Figure A3). 
To further investigate these first observations, we apply a series of binary logit models and 
non-parametric Mann–Whitney U (MW-U) tests. The discussion throughout the paper is 
primarily based on the regression results. We refer to the MW-U tests (provided in the 
Appendix) only in cases where differences between the two statistical measures appear. We 
include both treatment indicators and a set of additional control variables in different model 
specifications. In this section, we focus on treatment effects only, providing a more detailed 
discussion on the controls and their impact on take-up in section 4.3.  
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Table 2: Summary statistics of the experimental results  
Only first booking 
Treatment control 1:1 r-50% 3:1 r-75% 1/3:1 r-25% All 
         
compensated bookings (%) 27.0 30.8 35.7 29.1 36.2 26.2 30.6 30.8 
resulting compensation :         
- without match (kg CO2) 3.4 3.9 4.5 3.6 4.7 3.3 3.9 3.9 
- including match (kg CO2) 3.4 7.8 4.5 14.4 4.7 4.4 3.9 6.2 
offsetting payments          
- total payments (€ cents) 6.0 13.8 8.0 25.6 8.4 7.7 7.0 11.0 
- by customers (€ cents) 6.0 6.9 4.0 6.4 2.1 5.8 5.2 5.2 
Observations 1,317 1,243 1,295 1,316 1,270 1,307 1,276 9,024 
All bookings 
Treatment control 1:1 r-50% 3:1 r-75% 1/3:1 r-25% All 
         
compensated bookings (%) 26.8 31.4 34.0 28.3 34.6 26.1 29.9 30.1 
resulting compensation:         
- without match (kg CO2) 3.3 3.9 4.2 3.5 4.5 3.2 3.8 3.8 
- including match (kg CO2) 3.3 7.8 4.2 13.9 4.5 4.3 3.8 6.0 
offsetting payments          
- total payment (€ cents) 5.9 13.8 7.5 24.7 7.9 7.7 6.7 10.6 
- by customers (€ cents) 5.9 6.9 3.7 6.2 2.0 5.8 5.0 5.1 
Observations 1,542 1,463 1,522 1,557 1,496 1,557 1,486 10,623 
 
The regression results widely confirm our descriptive observations (Table 3). All model 
specifications indicate a positive effect of all price rebate schemes on participation in contrast 
to the control group (r-25%: p < 0.05, r-50 and r-75%: p < 0.01). Behavioral responses to 
matching grants again remain rather modest. Only 1:1 matching appears to be clearly 
effective enhancing participation across the different model specifications (at least p < 0.05). 
The coefficient for the weaker matching intervention 1/3:1 is even negative but does not 
differ significantly from zero. The effect of 3:1 matching is positive but slightly off 
conventional levels of significance (0.10 < p < 0.15). A potential driver of the missing 
significance might be the higher total amounts of CO2 in the 3:1 treatment. When controlling 
for total kg of CO2 including the matched quantities in models (5) and (6) in Table 3, we 
indeed do find a significant effect of the highest matching scheme.8 
 
 
 
 
 
8 The correlation between 3:1 and totalCO2 is 0.56. Hence, we should not expect biased results due to multicollinearity. Nevertheless we are 
aware that this estimate might slightly overestimate the effect of 3:1 matching. Figure A5 plots the predicted offsetting probabilities over the 
amount of CO2, both including and excluding matches, and thus visualizes the different sizes of the estimated treatment effects. 
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Table 3: Maximum likelihood estimates in binary logit models, treatment effects and 
determinants on offsetting behavior, only first booking, dependent variable: 
participation 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
r-25% 0.172** 0.201** 0.198** 0.193** 0.191** 
 (0.0869) (0.0882) (0.0882) (0.0883) (0.0882) 
r-50% 0.404*** 0.431*** 0.431*** 0.427*** 0.424*** 
 (0.0849) (0.0861) (0.0861) (0.0861) (0.0860) 
r-75% 0.427*** 0.462*** 0.462*** 0.455*** 0.452*** 
 (0.0852) (0.0865) (0.0865) (0.0865) (0.0865) 
1/3:1 -0.0443 -0.0187 -0.0206 -0.0208 -0.00685 
 (0.0884) (0.0894) (0.0894) (0.0894) (0.0902) 
1:1 0.184** 0.225** 0.222** 0.222** 0.264*** 
 (0.0873) (0.0881) (0.0881) (0.0881) (0.0959) 
3:1 0.103 0.134 0.130 0.130 0.257* 
 (0.0868) (0.0878) (0.0878) (0.0878) (0.140) 
CO2  -0.00837***    
  (0.00266)    
CO2 per trip   -0.0171** -0.0165*  
   (0.00844) (0.00844)  
return ticket   0.0144 0.0151 0.00983 
   (0.0504) (0.0504) (0.0503) 
group ticket   -0.262*** -0.261*** -0.263*** 
   -0.0171** -0.0165* (0.0821) 
relative price    -0.710*** -0.801*** 
    (0.217) (0.303) 
total CO2 per trip     -0.00488 
     (0.00428) 
voucher  -0.248 -0.245 -0.262 -0.263 
  (0.175) (0.175) (0.176) (0.176) 
info  1.890*** 1.879*** 1.879*** 1.876*** 
  (0.185) (0.184) (0.184) (0.184) 
female  -0.0865* -0.0906* -0.0896* -0.0905* 
  (0.0462) (0.0463) (0.0463) (0.0463) 
constant -0.993*** -0.897*** -0.832*** -0.828*** -0.926*** 
 (0.0620) (0.0747) (0.0989) (0.0989) (0.0778) 
      
log likelihood -5541.77 -5474.85 -5472.36 -5471.18 -5472.44 
observations 9,024 9,024 9,024 9,024 9,024 
Note: Omitted treatment category is control, robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4: Postestimation Wald tests on selected explanatory variables after binary logit 
regression on participation decision, column (4) 
Coefficient  r-50% r-75% 1/3:1 1:1 3:1 
r-25% <*** <*** >** < < 
r-50%  < >*** >** >*** 
r-75%   >*** >*** >*** 
1/3:1    <*** <* 
1:1     < 
Note: We compare rows with columns. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, We test whether the difference of two estimated coefficients is 
significantly different from zero, e.q. we test whether b[r-25%]  = b[r-50%]. 
 
We compute average marginal and discrete probability effects to get an impression on the 
magnitude of the estimated treatment effects (Table A3). Point estimates of the first booking 
suggest price rebates to increase the propensity to take part in the offsetting campaign in the 
first booking by 4.0 percentage points for r-25%, 8.9 for r-50% and 9.5 for r-75%. 
Confidence intervals (reported at 95%-significance levels) for the 50% and 75% price 
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reduction cover similar ranges (5.4 to 12.4 percentage points for r-50% and 6.0 to 13.0 
percentage points for r-75%). That is, additional effects of a three-quarter price rebate in 
contrast to a 50% price rebate remain rather modest. Moreover, 1:1 matching grants increase 
the propensity to contribute by 4.6 percentage points (95% conf. interval: 1.0 to 8.2 
percentage points). We summarize these first findings and obtain our first result: 
Result 1 
Price reductions of 25% or more and a 1:1 matching scheme increase the share of passengers 
that offset their CO2 emissions in the first booking decision. Controlling for the fact that 
matching schemes always require participants to purchase higher quantities further also 
reveals a positive effect of 3:1 matching on participation.  
In a next step, we are interested to what extent the intensity of the intervention affects 
decision behavior. For the case of matching rates, equal shares (1:1) lead to more offsetting 
than smaller matches (1/3:1, p < 0.01, Table 4) while, similar to the findings of Karlan and 
List (2007), large matching rates (3:1) do not have any additional impact compared to 1:1. 
Similarly, price rebates of 50% and 75% lead to higher participation rates compared to a 
rebate of 25% (p < 0.01, Table 4). A three-quarter price rebate, however, does not yield any 
additional effect compared to r-50%. Hence, the results of Karlan and List (2007) seem to 
generalize to price rebates. We formulate the following result that complements our previous 
findings: 
Result 2 
Both in price rebates and matching schemes, an equal split of contributions between 
passenger and bus company (1:1 or r-50%) leads to higher participation rates than a weaker 
intervention (1/3:1 or r-25%) and is statistically equivalent to a stronger intervention (3:1 or 
r-75%). 
Third, our design enables us to compare price rebates and matching grants with the same price 
per unit CO2 of giving (e.g., 1:1 vs. r-50%). Offsetting behavior clearly differs between the 
two types of interventions. Within pairs, price rebates always lead to higher participation rates 
than matching grants (1:1 vs. r-50%: p < 0.05, 1/3:1 vs. r-25%: p < 0.1, 3:1 vs. r-75%: p < 
0.01, Table 4). This result is in stark contrast to previous evidence from a pure public good 
context. Of course, we are aware that our design embeds further aspects that may limit the 
comparability of the two classes of interventions. In particular, passengers were not able to 
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adjust offsetting quantities but faced a binary choice in our experimental setting. The 
comparison of price rebates and matching grants thus involves different quantity levels (see 
Table 2). To mitigate this difference between treatments we control for total amounts of CO2 
(including the matched kilograms). However, even then, the smaller effect size of matches 
persists (see Table 3, model (5)). This provides evidence that decision behavior in our setting 
differs more fundamentally from a pure public goods context. We suggest that the degree of 
responsibility for the emissions that are being offset may explain our results. In rebate 
schemes, participants always decide upon offsets equivalent to the emissions caused by their 
specific trip. In contrast, in the matching schemes the benefits compared to the baseline 
setting are given by additional offsets unrelated to the current trip. In particular, in the 3:1 
scheme, the unrelated offsets even outweigh the related ones. To further explore this idea, we 
run an additional set of regressions controlling for the resulting unit price (€/tCO2) and the 
share of offsets exceeding own emissions instead of treatment dummies. We find smaller 
shares of participation for matches than for price rebates. Moreover, we report a lower 
propensity to offset as the share of unrelated emissions increases (see Table A5). Despite the 
inherent limitations of the analysis, our results suggest that the willingness to offset emissions 
beyond the related environmental harmful behavior remains rather modest. This might 
hamper the effectivity of matching schemes in this context, in particular for large matching 
rates. 
Result 3 
Passengers are less likely to compensate as the share of offsets unrelated to their trip 
increases. 
4.2. Contributions 
Next, we turn to resulting contribution levels. Except for 1/3:1, total average offsetting 
payments (including matches) are higher in all treatments than in the control group (see Table 
2), being highest in 3:1 matching. These differences are also significant (see Table 5) and 
show that all but the 1/3:1 scheme reach the goal of increasing the share of carbon neutral 
transportation services. Our main interest, however, lies in the contributions by the customers 
net of subsidies, as the company could increase offsets at own costs in the absence of 
incentive schemes.9 Averaged over all first booking decisions, net contributions amount to 
5.2 cents (in €) per booking (Table 2 and Figure A4). In the rebate conditions, passengers 
9 Note that a true efficiency analysis would require capturing all costs and benefits that arise from implementing the different schemes. For 
simplicity we assume these to be zero and constant across schemes. 
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contribute 5.2 cents (r-25%), 4.0 cents (r-50%), and 2.1 cents (r-75%) and thus less than in 
the control group (6.0 cents). Contributions in the matching schemes amount to 5.8 cents 
(1/3:1), 6.9 cents (1:1), and 6.4 cents (3:1). Hence, only the 1:1 and the 3:1 matching scheme 
induce customers to contribute more than in a control setting. We conduct a series of Tobit 
regressions to further investigate these differences (Table 5). The results of a MW-U test are 
reported in the Appendix (Table A2). In this subsection, again, we only focus on treatment 
effects and provide a more detailed discussion on the controls in section 4.3. The regression 
results confirm the superiority of the 1:1 matching scheme (p < 0.05, Table 5, columns 4-6) 
which is also the only scheme inducing significantly higher net contributions than in the 
control group. Moreover, there is statistical evidence that net contributions averaged over all 
customers are lower in r-75% than in the control group (p < 0.1, Table 5, columns 4-6). This 
effect is intuitive as equalizing net contributions in r-75% compared to the control group 
would require participation rates to quadruple. Given our results from the previous section, 
we know that participation rates only rise modestly and are far from reaching 100% in r-75%. 
Summarizing these observations, we obtain the following result: 
Result 4 
1:1 matching is the only incentive scheme effectively increasing customers’ net contributions 
in contrast to the baseline scenario. 
We now consider the effect of the intensity of the treatments on net contributions. A price 
rebate of 75% significantly decreases net contribution levels in contrast to smaller 
interventions (r-25%: p < 0.05, r-50%: p < 0.01, Table 6). The difference between r-25% and 
r-50% is not significant in our sample. In line with the observations on participation rates, a 
1:1 match leads to higher net contribution than the weaker intervention (p < 0.01) and is 
statistically equivalent to the 3:1 match. Pairwise comparisons between matches and rebates 
reveal that the latter lead to lower average contribution levels (see also Figure A4). Based on 
Tobit regressions, differences become significant for medium (r-50% vs. 1:1, p < 0.05) and 
high (r-75% and 3:1, p < 0.01) interventions (see Table 6) confirming the superiority of 
matching rates in raising contribution levels (e.g., Eckel and Grossman 2008). 
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Table 5: Maximum likelihood estimates in Tobit models, treatment effects and 
determinants of offsetting behavior, only first booking, dependent variable: payments 
Explanatory variables payment_tot 
(1) 
payment_tot 
(2) 
payment_tot 
(3) 
payment_pass 
(4) 
payment _pass 
(5) 
payment _pass 
(6) 
r-25% 5.171** 5.322** 5.267** 0.245 0.264 0.237 
 (2.522) (2.433) (2.443) (1.325) (1.262) (1.267) 
r-50% 11.42*** 11.43*** 11.41*** 0.437 0.384 0.376 
 (2.444) (2.347) (2.357) (1.227) (1.168) (1.172) 
r-75% 12.50*** 12.46*** 12.29*** -2.132* -2.225** -2.309** 
 (2.463) (2.359) (2.374) (1.185) (1.133) (1.139) 
1/3:1 1.962 2.567 2.557 -0.673 -0.417 -0.420 
 (2.640) (2.543) (2.542) (1.394) (1.328) (1.327) 
1:1 15.79*** 16.55*** 16.64*** 2.828** 3.123** 3.164** 
 (2.837) (2.688) (2.730) (1.415) (1.330) (1.349) 
3:1 31.42*** 32.05*** 32.07*** 1.425 1.673 1.675 
 (3.272) (3.147) (3.152) (1.365) (1.301) (1.300) 
CO2  0.850***   0.416***  
  (0.148)   (0.0701)  
CO2 per trip   1.369***   0.677*** 
   (0.291)   (0.134) 
return ticket   12.97***   6.271*** 
   (1.671)   (0.747) 
group ticket   7.665**   3.795*** 
   (3.153)   (1.416) 
relative price   -8.164***   -3.702*** 
   (1.289)   (0.569) 
voucher  -4.230 -5.050  -1.545 -1.932 
  (5.794) (5.856)  (2.554) (2.594) 
info  53.36*** 53.84***  24.11*** 24.35*** 
  (5.812) (6.457)  (2.311) (2.654) 
female  -2.423* -2.708*  -1.178* -1.314** 
  (1.448) (1.455)  (0.649) (0.653) 
Constant -41.38*** -50.71*** -61.87*** -13.46*** -17.86*** -23.50*** 
 (2.547) (3.475) (5.823) (1.169) (1.543) (2.630) 
       
Log Likelihood -18264.7 -18139.3 -18138.1 -16221.8 -15975.6 -15975.0 
Observations 9,024 9,024 9,024 9,024 9,024 9,024 
Note: Omitted treatment category is control, robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 6: Postestimation Wald tests on selected explanatory variables after Tobit 
regression on compensation levels, column (6) 
Coefficient  r-50% r-75% 1/3:1 1:1 3:1 
r-25% < >** > <** < 
r-50%  >*** > <** < 
r-75%   >* <* <*** 
1/3:1    <*** < 
1:1     > 
Note: We compare rows with columns. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, We test whether the difference of two estimated coefficients is 
significantly different from zero, e.g. we test whether b[r-25%]  = b[r-50%]. 
 
Intuitively, this result is also in line with a certain inelasticity of demand with respect to 
prices. Rebates affect both the payments made by the customer and the customer’s demand. 
Based on our data, the first effect dominates the latter, leading to smaller contribution levels – 
both compared to matching schemes and baseline. Put differently, the increase in participation 
in the different rebate schemes is not able to compensate the lower average contribution levels 
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for each individual that decides to contribute. We summarize these findings by the following 
result: 
Result 5 
Pairwise comparisons between rebates and matches reveal that matches lead to higher 
contribution levels. The comparative advantage increases in size and significance as the 
intervention becomes stronger. 
4.3. Further determinants of behavior 
In this section, we analyze the impact of further explanatory variables on decision behavior. 
As a single booking process may contain several trips we control for the “size” of the booking 
in different ways. In the simplest approach we simply include the total amount of CO2 
emissions attributed to the booking in (CO2). In a next step, we decompose this value into its 
underlying factors: the length of the single leg trip, captured by the corresponding emission 
level (CO2 per trip), whether the journey was booked as a return trip (return ticket) and 
whether tickets were bought for more than one traveler (group ticket). All three components 
are hardly correlated and thus allow us to perform a decomposition of the effect of CO2. We 
also look at the share of compensation costs with respect to the total price of the booking 
(relative price) and at the amount of CO2 per trip including the match (totalCO2 per trip). 
Further controls include voucher, equaling one if an individual redeemed a coupon leading to 
a cost reduction of the trip, and the indicator variable info which equals one if customers click 
on the ‘Info button’ to get more detailed information on the offsetting activity. Interestingly, 
only a small minority of customers (about 1.5%) make use of this possibility to learn more 
about the offsetting activity, the quality labels and the project where contributions are 
collected for suggesting little interest in this kind of information during the first booking. 
Given the small share of customers learning about the underlying project we are confident 
that we measure the demand for carbon offsets and not the customers’ support for a specific 
project. Based on the dummy variable female we control for potential differences between 
men and women. We provide descriptive information on explanatory variables in Table 1. 
Our regression results suggest the CO2 per trip and group tickets reduce responsiveness to the 
interventions while it is irrelevant whether the return ticket was booked or not (Table 3 and 
Table 5). That is, the propensity to contribute significantly decreases if individuals purchase a 
ticket not only for a single person (presumably the buyer) but requires decisions for other 
persons that are not necessarily present when the ticket is purchased. This finding is in line 
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with experimental evidence from a dictator game with an environmental organization (the 
WWF) (Carlsson et al. 2011). Average donation decreases in a scheme where the decision of 
the dictator on contribution levels applies to all group members. Estimating average marginal 
effects suggest the propensity to contribute to the carbon offsetting program for groups to be 
5.4 percentage points lower than for single bookings (p < 0.01, Table A3). 
Averaged over all treatments, female customers make less use of the offsetting program than 
men, both in terms of participation rates and contribution levels. The point estimate of the 
average marginal effect of being female amounts to 1.9 percentage points with respect to 
participation (p < 0.05, Table A3) and to 1.3 Euro cents with respect to contribution levels (p 
< 0.05, Table A4). Does this mean that women are less likely to contribute in this context? 
This would be a clear contradiction to the literature that finds women to donate significantly 
more than men in charitable giving experiments (e.g., Eckel et al. 2007, Li et al. 2011). We 
apply a more detailed analysis on interaction to study gender effects. First, we interact the 
female dummy with a dummy that is one for the control condition and zero in all subsidy 
treatments (female X control) and find that the negative effect only holds for the subsidy 
treatments, while the estimate is even positive for the control setting (Table A6, columns (1) 
and (4)). Hence, there is no negative baseline effect for females but rather a reduction of the 
treatment effects. Next, we split the sample in male and female bookers and report smaller 
treatment effects for female bookers compared to men (Table A6, columns (2), (3), (5) and 
(6)). In particular, we do not find any significant effect of matching schemes for women.10  
Our results add to the mixed evidence on gender effects in this context. Previous experimental 
findings on carbon offsets report gender neutrality (Löfgren et al. 2012, Diederich and 
Goeschl 2014, Blasch and Farsi 2014), rather positive effects for men (Löschel et al. 2013b) 
or positive effects for women (MacKerron et al. 2009). Gender specific treatment effects of 
matching schemes, however, have to our knowledge not been reported in the literature yet and 
deserve further investigation. They are, to some extent, related to the findings of Karlan and 
List (2007), who pointed out that matching schemes only worked in states where the Bush 
administration was supported in a hitherto election. In Karlan and List, the target of 
contributions was a liberal political institution, suggesting that in particular those typically not 
inclined to donate are stimulated by the financial incentives. A similar story might hold in our 
case as men, donating weakly less than women in baseline, react strongest in the presence of 
stimuli (Table A6). These findings are also in line with Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) who 
10 Adding interaction terms of treatment effects and the gender dummy in the regressions in Table 3 support this finding. 
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find that women are more generous than men when it is relatively expensive to give, while 
men begin to give more than women as the price of giving decreases. Their findings for prize 
manipulations seem to generalize to subsidy schemes. 
Clicking on the info button is positively correlated with stronger participation in the offsetting 
program. Given the small share of people actually using his option and the potential for self-
selection we do not interpret this finding as a causal relationship. Summarizing the most 
important factors from the regression analysis beyond treatment effects yields our next 
observation: 
Result 6 
Group purchases, longer travel distances and high costs relative to the actual ticket price 
reduce the likelihood to take part in the carbon offsetting program. Women are less 
responsive to the incentive schemes than men. 
4.4. Long-term effects 
We use the full sample of bookings, including repeated bookings, to explore potential long-
term effects of the different treatments. It is important to point out that due to our 
randomization procedure repeated customers were reassigned to the same treatment. Hence, 
we can measure the individual number of repeated bookings of the same passenger 
(recurrences), indicating the number of times the individual has been exposed to the 
treatment.11 
In a first step, we add recurrences (Table 7 and Table 8) to capture a general trend for 
repeated bookers. A key insight is that point estimates for marginal effects of the treatments 
are smaller in size (and significance) than in the analysis of first bookings Table A7 and Table 
A8). Moreover, the variable recurrences has a negative and significant coefficient in all model 
specifications (p < 0.05, Table 7), showing that the propensity to offset emissions is 
decreasing in the number of bookings made by the same ID. This observation is in line with 
the findings of Allcott and Rogers (2014) on long-term impacts of behavioral interventions 
and may raise concerns on the effects of these contribution schemes for returning customers. 
As shown in Table A7, for each additional booking process (per ID) the probability to 
contribute decreases on average by 2.3 percentage points. 
11 We also investigated the effect of treatment assignment on recurrences but the differences do not appear to be significant in our sample. 
The results are not included in the paper but are available upon request. 
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Table 7: Maximum likelihood estimates in binary logit models, treatment effects and 
determinants on offsetting behavior, all bookings, dependent variable: participation 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
r-25% 0.152* 0.177** 0.174** 0.169** 0.168** 
 (0.0808) (0.0819) (0.0819) (0.0820) (0.0820) 
r-50% 0.342*** 0.368*** 0.367*** 0.363*** 0.361*** 
 (0.0790) (0.0799) (0.0799) (0.0799) (0.0799) 
r-75% 0.372*** 0.399*** 0.400*** 0.394*** 0.392*** 
 (0.0792) (0.0803) (0.0803) (0.0803) (0.0803) 
1/3:1 -0.0338 -0.01000 -0.0120 -0.0121 -0.00464 
 (0.0816) (0.0825) (0.0825) (0.0825) (0.0832) 
1:1 0.227*** 0.266*** 0.263*** 0.263*** 0.285*** 
 (0.0807) (0.0813) (0.0813) (0.0813) (0.0887) 
3:1 0.0779 0.106 0.102 0.102 0.170 
 (0.0805) (0.0813) (0.0813) (0.0813) (0.130) 
CO2  -0.00899***    
  (0.00252)    
CO2 per trip   -0.0141* -0.0135*  
   (0.00785) (0.00785)  
return ticket   -0.00264 -0.00203 -0.00725 
   (0.0470) (0.0470) (0.0469) 
group ticket   -0.297*** -0.296*** -0.298*** 
   (0.0768) (0.0768) (0.0768) 
relative costs    -0.688*** -0.784*** 
    (0.200) (0.269) 
total CO2 per trip     -0.00260 
     (0.00399) 
voucher  -0.379** -0.378** -0.391** -0.391** 
  (0.158) (0.159) (0.159) (0.159) 
info  1.899*** 1.887*** 1.888*** 1.884*** 
  (0.183) (0.182) (0.182) (0.182) 
female  -0.105** -0.109** -0.109** -0.109** 
  (0.0428) (0.0429) (0.0429) (0.0429) 
recurrences -0.131*** -0.114*** -0.114*** -0.113*** -0.112** 
 (0.0440) (0.0438) (0.0437) (0.0437) (0.0437) 
Constant -0.982*** -0.863*** -0.823*** -0.820*** -0.911*** 
 (0.0580) (0.0696) (0.0924) (0.0924) (0.0726) 
      
log likelihood -6470.08 -6397.22 -6394.06 -6392.82 -6394.07 
Observations 10,623 10,623 10,623 10,623 10,623 
Note: Omitted treatment category is control, standard errors are clustered per ID, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Maximum likelihood estimates in Tobit models, treatment effects and 
determinants of offsetting behavior, all bookings, dependent variable: payments 
Explanatory variables payment_tot 
(1) 
payment _tot 
(2) 
payment _tot 
(3) 
payment_pass 
(4) 
payment _pass 
(5) 
payment _pass 
(6) 
r-25% 4.377* 4.576** 4.469** -0.158 -0.113 -0.162 
 (2.342) (2.265) (2.275) (1.230) (1.175) (1.180) 
r-50% 9.491*** 9.568*** 9.492*** -0.410 -0.431 -0.463 
 (2.271) (2.190) (2.197) (1.142) (1.092) (1.096) 
r-75% 10.79*** 10.80*** 10.62*** -2.765** -2.834*** -2.920*** 
 (2.288) (2.199) (2.210) (1.104) (1.059) (1.064) 
1/3:1 2.228 2.818 2.856 -0.540 -0.287 -0.265 
 (2.435) (2.348) (2.350) (1.289) (1.229) (1.230) 
1:1 16.80*** 17.35*** 17.40*** 3.320** 3.514*** 3.541*** 
 (2.598) (2.470) (2.503) (1.297) (1.224) (1.240) 
3:1 30.10*** 30.60*** 30.64*** 1.020 1.210 1.227 
 (3.021) (2.911) (2.915) (1.267) (1.210) (1.210) 
CO2  0.817***   0.405***  
  (0.137)   (0.0650)  
CO2 per trip   1.444***   0.690*** 
   (0.271)   (0.124) 
return ticket   12.36***   6.040*** 
   (1.566)   (0.702) 
group ticket   6.290**   3.253** 
   (2.957)   (1.330) 
relative price   -8.644***   -3.915*** 
   (1.374)   (0.595) 
voucher  -9.417* -10.06*  -3.662 -3.973* 
  (5.202) (5.252)  (2.300) (2.335) 
info  53.57*** 53.92***  24.26*** 24.47*** 
  (5.728) (6.319)  (2.279) (2.595) 
female  -3.144** -3.421**  -1.516** -1.647*** 
  (1.346) (1.352)  (0.603) (0.607) 
recurrences -4.623*** -3.267** -3.226** -2.048*** -1.331** -1.319** 
 (1.392) (1.326) (1.322) (0.636) (0.599) (0.599) 
Constant -40.87*** -49.36*** -55.56*** -13.30*** -17.38*** -20.24*** 
 (2.355) (3.211) (3.745) (1.072) (1.415) (1.641) 
       
log likelihood -21102.9 -20971.0 -20968.4 -18625.8 -18479.2 -18478.8     
Observations 10,623 10,623 10,623 10,623 10,623 10,623 
Note: Omitted treatment category is control, robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
To shed further light on the dynamics of our contribution schemes we add treatment-specific 
time effects in our regression models. We study the interaction of treatment effects and 
recurrences both for participation and contribution levels by interacting recurrences with the 
respective treatment (Table 9). The estimation results on participation rates (columns 1-3) 
show negative trends for repeated bookings both in all price schemes, but being significant 
only for r-50% (p < 0.01) and r-75% (p < 0.05) (Table 9, columns 1-3). Similarly, we report a 
decreasing impact of 3:1 matching (p < 0.1). There is, however, statistical evidence that the 
provision of 1:1 matches increases the share of compensated bookings over time (p < 0.1). 
This suggests that bookers do not use alternating offsetting strategies in the presence of 1:1 
matches. Rather the share of bookers increases over time.  
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With respect to compensation levels, we get a similar picture. There is a negative trend for all 
rebate schemes being significant for r-50% (p < 0.01) and r-75% (p < 0.05) (Table 9, columns 
3-6). As before, there is a negative trend for 3:1 matching (p < 0.1) whereas the equal 
matching scheme (1:1) is the only incentive scheme where contributions do not decrease over 
time. We obtain the following result: 
Result 7 
For large rebates (r-50% and r-75%) we find a decreasing impact on participation over time. 
The effects of matching schemes seem to be more stable over time. In the long run, only the 
equal sharing rule (1:1) can maintain both higher participation and compensation levels for 
repeated bookings. 
With respect to control variables, the previously significant drivers of compensation behavior, 
group and female, appear and exhibit similar signs and levels of significance as before.  
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Table 9: Maximum likelihood estimates in binary logit and Tobit models, treatment-
specific time effects for repeated booking processes and determinants on offsetting 
behavior, dependent variable: participation or compensation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Explanatory variables participation participation participation compensation compensation Compensatio
n 
r-25% 0.183** 0.211** 0.203** 0.00270 0.00323 0.00302 
 (0.0858) (0.0871) (0.0872) (0.0131) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
r-50% 0.416*** 0.444*** 0.439*** 0.00510 0.00503 0.00508 
 (0.0839) (0.0850) (0.0850) (0.0121) (0.0115) (0.0116) 
r-75% 0.422*** 0.456*** 0.449*** -0.0227* -0.0231** -0.0239** 
 (0.0844) (0.0857) (0.0857) (0.0117) (0.0112) (0.0113) 
1/3:1 -0.0362 -0.0102 -0.0123 -0.00694 -0.00390 -0.00381 
 (0.0871) (0.0881) (0.0881) (0.0137) (0.0131) (0.0131) 
1:1 0.183** 0.225*** 0.222** 0.0267* 0.0300** 0.0305** 
 (0.0863) (0.0871) (0.0871) (0.0138) (0.0131) (0.0132) 
3:1 0.113 0.144* 0.140 0.0152 0.0178 0.0178 
 (0.0858) (0.0867) (0.0868) (0.0135) (0.0128) (0.0128) 
control X recurrences -0.0179 0.0112 0.0130 -0.00888 2.88e-06 0.000648 
 (0.115) (0.114) (0.114) (0.0169) (0.0162) (0.0162) 
r-25% X recurrences -0.200 -0.181 -0.182 -0.0339* -0.0252 -0.0261 
 (0.125) (0.124) (0.124) (0.0178) (0.0169) (0.0169) 
r-50 X recurrences -0.467*** -0.439*** -0.443*** -0.0654*** -0.0566*** -0.0578*** 
 (0.124) (0.123) (0.123) (0.0165) (0.0156) (0.0154) 
r-75% X recurrences -0.301** -0.304** -0.297** -0.0368** -0.0292** -0.0289** 
 (0.121) (0.123) (0.123) (0.0144) (0.0137) (0.0137) 
1/3:1 X recurrences -0.0171 0.000758 0.00129 -0.00244 0.00375 0.00504 
 (0.109) (0.108) (0.108) (0.0174) (0.0162) (0.0163) 
1:1 X recurrences 0.197* 0.211* 0.213* 0.0221 0.0239* 0.0234* 
 (0.112) (0.113) (0.112) (0.0146) (0.0142) (0.0141) 
3:1 X recurrences -0.220* -0.204* -0.200 -0.0371** -0.0318* -0.0304* 
 (0.123) (0.122) (0.122) (0.0185) (0.0178) (0.0177) 
CO2  -0.00908***   0.00405***  
  (0.00253)   (0.000651)  
CO2 per trip   -0.0144*   0.00679*** 
   (0.00785)   (0.00124) 
return ticket   0.000964   0.0608*** 
   (0.0471)   (0.00702) 
group ticket   -0.295***   0.0330** 
   (0.0772)   (0.0133) 
relative costs   -0.689***   -0.0387*** 
   (0.202)   (0.00591) 
voucher  -0.374** -0.387**  -0.0357 -0.0388* 
  (0.159) (0.160)  (0.0230) (0.0234) 
info  1.900*** 1.888***  0.242*** 0.244*** 
  (0.184) (0.182)  (0.0229) (0.0260) 
female  -0.108** -0.111***  -0.0154** -0.0167*** 
  (0.0429) (0.0430)  (0.00604) (0.00607) 
Constant -1.002*** -0.883*** -0.835*** -0.135*** -0.176*** -0.204*** 
 (0.0613) (0.0727) (0.0944) (0.0112) (0.0146) (0.0168) 
       
log likelihood -6458.33 -6385.39 -6381.03 -3884.49 -3738.09 -3737.55 
Observations 10,623 10,623 10,623 10,623 10,623 10,623 
Note: (1)-(3) logit regressions on participation, (4)-(6) Tobit regressions on contributions, omitted treatment category is control, robust 
standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Finally, we take a look at individual behavior after removing the incentive schemes (Table 
10). In this stage (stage 3), no incentives are provided, all customers face the same decision 
situation. Observed bookings in the post intervention period allow us to study potential spill-
over effects of the different stimuli during the time after their removal. In the long-run, r-25% 
leads to slightly lower participation in the offsetting program compared to the control group, 
while the remaining five treatments are followed by higher participation rates. Most of these 
differences, however, appear to be not statistically significant in our sample. Again, only the 
1:1 matching scheme yields the highest, and the only statistically significant effect (p < 0.10). 
Hence, the 1:1 matching schemes induce spill-over effects and increase contributions even 
after their removal. 
In a related study, Meier (2007) studies the long-run effects of two matching schemes (1/4:1 
and 1/2:1). He observes decision behavior over a series of years and finds a short term 
positive effect in the year when the matching schemes were in act. In the subsequent year, 
when the matching schemes were removed, he finds negative effects. Over the full period of 
four years, including the treatment year, both effects cancel out such that no treatment effect 
remains. The treatment closest to Meier’s setting is our 1/3:1 matching scheme where we also 
find smaller participation than in baseline, even though the difference is not significant. For 
stronger matching rates, however, we find positive effects in the long-run with the strongest 
results for the 1:1 matching rate. Hence, our findings suggest that Meier’s results may not 
carry over to matching rates equal to one. This novel finding adds to the scarce evidence on 
the long-run effects of rebates and matching schemes and is summarized in our final result. 
Result 8 
There are positive spill-over effects from 1:1 matching schemes after their removal, 
increasing participation and contributions in subsequent bookings. 
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Table 10: Maximum likelihood estimates in binary logit and Tobit models, long-term 
effects after removal of intervention, dependent variable: participation or compensation  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Explanatory variables participation participation participation compensation compensation compensation 
r-25% (in stage 2) -0.160 -0.161 -0.156 -0.0267 -0.0250 -0.0238 
 (0.344) (0.345) (0.343) (0.0491) (0.0492) (0.0490) 
r-50% (in stage 2) 0.514 0.512 0.509 0.0841* 0.0833* 0.0832* 
 (0.316) (0.314) (0.313) (0.0457) (0.0456) (0.0454) 
r-75% (in stage 2) 0.445 0.444 0.441 0.0615 0.0613 0.0624 
 (0.311) (0.312) (0.312) (0.0449) (0.0449) (0.0448) 
1/3:1 (in stage 2) 0.142 0.141 0.131 0.0213 0.0211 0.0206 
 (0.317) (0.317) (0.317) (0.0455) (0.0455) (0.0454) 
1:1 (in stage 2) 0.580* 0.581* 0.574* 0.0882* 0.0886* 0.0881* 
 (0.323) (0.323) (0.322) (0.0469) (0.0469) (0.0468) 
3:1 (in stage 2) 0.356 0.357 0.349 0.0693 0.0697 0.0698 
 (0.314) (0.314) (0.314) (0.0456) (0.0456) (0.0455) 
amountco2pertrack -0.0438 -0.0438 -0.0369 0.00137 0.00140 0.00221 
 (0.0390) (0.0390) (0.0396) (0.00586) (0.00585) (0.00591) 
retour -0.584*** -0.583*** -0.587*** -0.0230 -0.0234 -0.0231 
 (0.197) (0.197) (0.199) (0.0295) (0.0294) (0.0295) 
nr_pas2 -0.829 -0.826 -0.829 -0.0520 -0.0513 -0.0498 
 (0.656) (0.656) (0.661) (0.0958) (0.0958) (0.0961) 
relative price 27.49 27.48 27.09 4.573 4.585 4.515 
 (23.78) (23.77) (23.73) (3.742) (3.738) (3.721) 
voucher -0.997 -0.993 -1.057 -0.138 -0.137 -0.141 
 (0.724) (0.724) (0.742) (0.103) (0.104) (0.105) 
info 2.137*** 2.140*** 2.199*** 0.233*** 0.234*** 0.243*** 
 (0.808) (0.809) (0.810) (0.0648) (0.0650) (0.0654) 
female -0.165 -0.165 -0.151 -0.0233 -0.0237 -0.0224 
 (0.168) (0.168) (0.168) (0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0247) 
recurrences  0.0179 0.00358  0.00543 0.00416 
(in stage 3)  (0.171) (0.177)  (0.0228) (0.0232) 
recurrences   0.137   0.0182 
(in stage 2)   (0.110)   (0.0151) 
Constant -0.318 -0.342 -0.575 -0.223* -0.230* -0.263** 
 (0.757) (0.792) (0.802) (0.116) (0.120) (0.123) 
       
log likelihood -440.93 -440.92 -440.07 -286.32 -286.06 -285.35 
Observations 827 827 827 828 827 827 
Note: (1)-(3) logit regressions on participation, (4)-(6) Tobit regressions on contributions, omitted treatment category is control (in stage 2), 
robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Forming adequate institutions to enhance the private provision of public good is a 
complicated challenge. The joint decision on both the consumption of a private and the 
contribution to a public good may provide an opportunity to foster voluntary contributions. 
Carbon offsets serve as a prominent application of this concept since they provide the 
opportunity to displace pollution externalities in connection to an underlying harm-related 
consumption decision.  
In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a carbon offsetting program based on a 
large-scaled field experiment in the long-distance bus market in Germany. We systematically 
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varied the individual payoff structure and introduced price rebates and matching grants in a 
randomized fashion.  
Our results suggest price rebates to be more effective in stimulating participation while net 
contributions are higher in the matching schemes. We report a modest sensitivity to prices 
with diminishing marginal effects for large rebates and matches. An equal split of 
contributions between the traveler and the bus company, in form of 1:1 matches or a 50% 
price rebates, enhances the participation in the offsetting program in contrast to the baseline 
scenario while larger matches or rebates do not have an additional effect. Hence, the missing 
impact of increasing stimuli beyond the equal share does not seem to be limited to donation 
matches (Karlan and List 2007), but also holds for prices rebates in our context. One 
speculative explanation for this finding is that both larger matching rates and price rebates 
may provoke skepticism e.g., concerning the quality or the effectiveness of the carbon offset. 
Our most appealing finding is the dominance of the 1:1 matching scheme in the long-run. 
While the treatment effects of rebates fade away over time, only the 1:1 matching scheme 
enhances contributions when bookers are treated repeatedly. Even after removing the 
subsidies, we report higher participation rates and contribution levels for booker previously 
facing a 1:1 matching scheme. The outstanding position of the equal matching scheme is 
somewhat surprising. We speculate that the equal matching scheme may be the only 
intervention that attributes a normative character to the offsetting decisions in the sense of a 
social proof, leading bookers to stick to their previous choices.  
The dominance of the 1:1 matching scheme may also contribute to the discussion on an 
acceptable burden sharing rule. The results indicate that a norm of 50-50 division possibly 
serves as an acceptable focal point on what could be a “fair” burden sharing concept between 
the producer and the consumer. Similar considerations hold for the 50% rebate scheme. This 
is in line with findings from the experimental literature showing that a large fraction of 
participants favor an equal split, even in dictator games where a single party determines the 
outcome (see Engel 2011 for a meta-study). There is, however, evidence that a higher degree 
of anonymity weakens the norm and leads to more selfish behavior which may lead to the 
hypothesis that people like to be perceived as fair (Andreoni and Bernheim 2009). Our results 
indicate that the linkage of public goods contributions to individual harm-related behavior 
might increase compliance with a 50-50 norm even if individual decisions are not observed by 
others. 
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These novel findings provide insights into the economics of environmental offsets and 
contribute to the discussion on how to successfully design interventions to foster individual 
efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. More generally, our analysis is one of the first 
randomized field trials to study public good contributions linked to a conventional 
consumption good. In our experiment, customers are given the possibility to offset their 
externalities just when they are about to purchase a conventional transportation good. Of 
course, this sequential decision structure differs from the classic impure public (“green”) good 
setting where the consumer directly chooses between a conventional and a green good, e.g. 
between conventional and shade-grown coffee or between electricity from renewable or non-
renewable resources. Nevertheless, the close connection between contributions and own 
responsibility remains the same. Our results suggest that the willingness to offset emissions 
beyond the harm level of related own behavior remains rather modest. It may thus be fruitful 
to extend this line of research to other contexts and choice structures. In particular, this may 
include decisions where individuals are able to independently determine their own 
contribution levels given the respective rebate or matching scheme, similar to the structure of 
charitable donation experiments.  
Other possible directions for future research include the analysis of information settings on 
voluntary offsetting contributions. One specific aspect may address the role of feedback, 
social information or social proof. Recent field-experimental findings by Shang and Croson 
(2009) suggest social information on previous contributions to have comparable effects to 
matching grants or price rebates on donations to local charities. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Mann-Whitney U (MW-U) tests on treatment differences (participation rate) 
 Only first booking 
Treatment 1:1 r-50% 3:1 r-75% 1/3:1 r-25% 
control -2.115 -4.790 -1.252 -5.015 0.531 -1.990 
 (0.0345) (0.0000) (0.2105) (0.0000) (0.5952) (0.0466) 
       
1:1  -2.618 0.881 -2.850 2.633 0.136 
  (0.0088) (0.3782) (0.0044) (0.0085) (0.8915) 
       
r-50%   3.549 -0.247 5.304 2.774 
   (0.0004) (0.8049) (0.0000) (0.0055) 
       
3:1    -3.780 1.780 -0.749 
    (0.0002) (0.0750) (0.4541) 
       
r-75%     5.526 3.007 
     (0.0000) (0.0026) 
       
1/3:1      -2.512 
      (0.0120) 
Note: According to a MW-U test, the null hypothesis states that the median of two independent observations is equal. The first booking per 
ID serves as an independent observation. We compare rows with columns and report both z – statistics and p – values (in parentheses). 
 
Table A2: Mann-Whitney U (MW-U) tests on treatment differences (contribution levels) 
 Only first booking 
Treatment 1:1 r-50% 3:1 r-75% 1/3:1 r-25% 
control -2.018 -1.344 -1.306 -0.004 0.502 -0.494 
 (0.0436) (0.1788) (0.1916) (0.9965) (0.6159) (0.6213) 
       
1:1  1.113 0.709 2.622 2.506 1.727 
  (0.2655) (0.4783) (0.0087) (0.0122) (0.0841) 
       
r-50%   -0.222 3.828 1.926 0.453 
   (0.8246) (0.0001) (0.054) (0.6503) 
       
3:1    1.591 1.779 0.929 
    (0.1116) (0.0753) (0.3531) 
       
r-75%     0.664 -1.885 
     (0.5068) (0.0594) 
       
1/3:1      -1.020 
      (0.3076) 
Note: According to a MW-U test, the null hypothesis states that the median of two independent observations is equal. The first booking per 
ID serves as an independent observation. We compare rows with columns and report both z – statistics and p – values (in parentheses). 
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Table A3: Average marginal and discrete probability effects of explanatory variables on 
participation decision  
Explanatory 
variables 
dy/dx [95% Conf. Intervall] 
r-25%   0.040** 0.004  0.076 
r-50%   0.089*** 0.054  0.124 
r-75%   0.095*** 0.060  0.130 
1/3:1  -0.004 -0.041  0.032 
1:1   0.046** 0.010  0.082 
3:1   0.027 -0.009  0.063 
CO2 per trip  -0.003** -0.007  0.000 
return ticket   0.003 -0.017  0.024 
group ticket  -0.054*** -0.088 -0.021 
relative cost  -0.148 -0.236 -0.059 
voucher  -0.054 -0.126  0.017 
info   0.391*** 0.318  0.464 
female  -0.019** -0.038  0.000 
Note: Average marginal and discrete probability effects are calculated after the ML estimation reported in Table 3, column (6), 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,  
Table A4: Average marginal and discrete probability effects of explanatory variables on 
compensation levels 
Explanatory 
variables 
dy/dx [95% Conf. Intervall] 
r-25%   0.237  -2.245   2.719 
r-50%   0.376  -1.921   2.673 
r-75%  -2.309**  -4.541  -0.077 
1/3:1  -0.420  -3.020   2.181 
1:1   3.164**   0.519   5.809 
3:1   1.675  -0.873   4.224 
CO2 per trip   0.677***   0.414   0.939 
return ticket   6.271***   4.808   7.734 
group ticket   3.795***   1.019   6.570 
relative cost  -3.702***  -4.817  -2.586 
voucher  -1.932  -7.016   3.152 
info 24.354*** 19.152 29.556 
female  -1.314**   -2.245  -0.350 
Note: Average marginal and discrete probability effects are calculated after the ML estimation reported in Table 5, column (6), 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
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Table A5: Alternative capture of treatment effects 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
      
unit price -25% 0.191** 0.184** 0.172** 0.191** 0.0863 0.106 
 (0.0794) (0.0823) (0.0869) (0.0882) (0.0760) (0.0772) 
unit price -50% 0.420*** 0.435*** 0.404*** 0.424*** 0.359*** 0.385*** 
 (0.0785) (0.0798) (0.0849) (0.0860) (0.0761) (0.0773) 
unit price -75% 0.393*** 0.448*** 0.427*** 0.452*** 0.451*** 0.471*** 
 (0.0788) (0.0826) (0.0852) (0.0865) (0.0839) (0.0859) 
match -0.255*** -0.182***     
 (0.0493) (0.0647)     
unit price -25% X match   -0.217** -0.198**   
   (0.0875) (0.0892)   
unit price -50% X match   -0.219*** -0.161*   
   (0.0845) (0.0927)   
unit price -75% X match    -0.325*** -0.196   
   (0.0842) (0.138)   
share matched CO2     -0.125*** -0.0801* 
     (0.0266) (0.0452) 
total CO2 per trip  -0.00507  -0.00488  -0.00477 
  (0.00330)  (0.00428)  (0.00429) 
group Ticket  -0.263***  -0.263***  -0.262*** 
  (0.0820)  (0.0821)  (0.0821) 
return Ticket  0.0102  0.00983  0.0106 
  (0.0503)  (0.0503)  (0.0503) 
relative cost  -0.793***  -0.801***  -1.050 
  (0.292)  (0.303)  (1.086) 
voucher  -0.263  -0.263  -0.264 
  (0.176)  (0.176)  (0.176) 
info  1.875***  1.876***  1.877*** 
  (0.184)  (0.184)  (0.183) 
female  -0.0905*  -0.0905*  -0.0918** 
  (0.0463)  (0.0463)  (0.0463) 
Constant -0.993*** -0.924*** -0.993*** -0.926*** -0.993*** -0.923*** 
 (0.0620) (0.0745) (0.0620) (0.0778) (0.0620) (0.0786) 
       
log likelihood -5542.29 -5472.50 -5541.77 -5472.44 -5544.57 -5474.91 
Observations 9,024 9,024 9,024 9,024 9,024 9,024 
Note: Omitted treatment category is control, robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A6: Gender specific regressions on participation decision and contribution levels 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
participation participation 
(males only) 
participation 
(females only) 
compensation compensation 
(males only) 
compensation 
(females only) 
p-25% 0.314*** 0.260** 0.148 1.409 0.987 0.0642 
 (0.114) (0.129) (0.125) (1.675) (1.911) (1.740) 
p-50% 0.549*** 0.555*** 0.353*** 1.551 1.898 0.208 
 (0.113) (0.126) (0.130) (1.603) (1.762) (1.772) 
p-75% 0.577*** 0.626*** 0.364** -1.133 -0.579 -2.122 
 (0.113) (0.126) (0.145) (1.580) (1.711) (1.972) 
1/3:1 0.102 0.0757 -0.115 0.760 0.269 -1.046 
 (0.115) (0.132) (0.122) (1.720) (1.999) (1.767) 
1:1 0.343*** 0.375*** 0.0811 4.336** 5.146** 1.431 
 (0.114) (0.128) (0.121) (1.749) (2.082) (1.763) 
3:1 0.251** 0.224* 0.0395 2.843* 2.413 1.071 
 (0.114) (0.127) (0.122) (1.693) (1.918) (1.764) 
CO2 per trip -0.0167** -0.0130 -0.0251* 0.676*** 0.812*** 0.416** 
 (0.00845) (0.0121) (0.0130) (0.134) (0.212) (0.181) 
return ticket 0.0140 -0.0153 0.0339 6.260*** 6.254*** 6.083*** 
 (0.0504) (0.0743) (0.0688) (0.747) (1.125) (0.988) 
group ticket -0.263*** -0.0978 -0.451*** 3.786*** 6.497*** 0.772 
 (0.0821) (0.111) (0.124) (1.417) (2.000) (2.017) 
relative price -0.711*** -0.835*** 6.150 -3.683*** -3.759*** 172.8 
 (0.219) (0.288) (8.203) (0.568) (0.680) (124.4) 
voucher -0.265 -0.126 -0.468* -1.963 0.345 -5.916 
 (0.176) (0.238) (0.275) (2.597) (3.692) (3.872) 
info 1.884*** 1.871*** 1.904*** 24.39*** 26.38*** 22.87*** 
 (0.184) (0.280) (0.242) (2.655) (5.042) (2.418) 
female -0.121**   -1.631**   
 (0.0497)   (0.695)   
female * control 0.234*   2.237   
 (0.136)   (1.997)   
Constant -0.932*** -0.971*** -0.823*** -21.59*** -23.62*** -20.07*** 
 (0.116) (0.137) (0.148) (2.036) (2.977) (2.306) 
       
log likelihood -5469.69 -2571.67 -2893.98 -15974.25 -7626.33 -8339.56 
Observations 9,024 4,197 4,827 9,024 4,197 4,827 
Note: Omitted treatment category is control, robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A7: Average marginal effects of explanatory variables on participation decision, 
all bookings  
Explanatory 
variables 
dy/dx [95% Conf. Intervall] 
r-25%   0.035**   0.002   0.068 
r-50%   0.075***   0.043   0.107 
r-75%   0.081***   0.049   0.113 
1/3:1  -0.003  -0.036   0.031 
1:1   0.054***   0.021   0.087 
3:1   0.021  -0.012   0.054 
CO2 per trip  -0.003*  -0.006   0.000 
return Ticket  -0.000  -0.019   0.019 
group Ticket  -0.061***  -0.092  -0.030 
relative price  -0.142***  -0.222  -0.061 
voucher  -0.081**  -0.449  -0.163 
info   0.389***   0.317  -0.461 
female  -0.022**  -0.040  -0.005 
recurrences  -0.023***   0.041   0.006 
Note: Average marginal and discrete probability effects are calculated after the ML estimation reported in Table 7, column (4),  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A8: Average marginal effects of explanatory variables on compensation levels, all 
bookings  
Explanatory 
variables 
dy/dx [95% Conf. Intervall] 
r-25%  -0.162  -2.475   2.150 
r-50%  -0.463  -2.610   1.684 
r-75%  -2.920***  -5.005  -0.835 
1/3:1  -0.265  -2.676   2.146 
1:1   3.541***   1.112   5.971 
3:1   1.227  -1.145   3.599 
CO2 per trip   0.690***   0.447   0.933 
return Ticket   6.040***   4.665   7.415 
group Ticket   3.253**   0.647   5.859 
relative price  -3.915***  -5.082  -2.748 
voucher  -3.973*  -8.549   0.603 
info 24.467*** 19.382 29.552 
female  -1.647***  -2.836  -0.458 
recurrences  -1.319***  -2.492  -0.145 
Note: Average marginal and discrete probability effects are calculated after the ML estimation reported in Table 8, column (6), 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure A1: Overview on field experimental setting 
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Figure A2: Experimental design  
Translated screenshot: control 
YOUR CHOSEN TRIP
BUS TRIP PRICE
1. Frankfurt a. M. ➔ Munich
Departure: THU, November 7, 2013, 12:00pm
Passenger:
Max Mustermann
Phone number:
012345678
24.00 €
2. Munich ➔ Frankfurt a.M
Departure: SUN, November 10, 2013, 11:35pm
Passenger:
Max Mustermann
Phone number:
012345678
29.00 €
Your bus trip generates 41.4 kg CO2 emissions. These emissions can be offset at a cost of 0.74€. 
Do you want to offset your emissions for 0.74€?
CO2 COMPENSATION
Additional information Yes No
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Translated screenshot: r-25% 
YOUR CHOSEN TRIP
BUS TRIP PRICE
1. Frankfurt a. M. ➔ Munich
Departure: THU, November 7, 2013, 12:00pm
Passenger:
Max Mustermann
Phone number:
012345678
24.00 €
2. Munich ➔ Frankfurt a.M
Departure: SUN, November 10, 2013, 11:35pm
Passenger:
Max Mustermann
Phone number:
012345678
29.00 €
Your bus trip generates 41.4 kg CO2 emissions. These emissions can be offset at a cost of 0.74€. 
Due to a campaign, we support your contribution to climate protection during this trip and we will 
cover a fourth of the related offsetting cost. For each € of your contribution we will immediately 
reimburse 0.25€.  As a result, you will pay 0.56 € instead of 0.74 €. 
Do you want to take part in the campaign and offset your emissions for 0.56€?
CO2 COMPENSATION
Additional information Yes No  
Translated screenshot: 1/3:1 
YOUR CHOSEN TRIP
BUS TRIP PRICE
1. Frankfurt a. M. ➔ Munich
Departure: THU, November 7, 2013, 12:00pm
Passenger:
Max Mustermann
Phone number:
012345678
24.00 €
2. Munich ➔ Frankfurt a.M
Departure: SUN, November 10, 2013, 11:35pm
Passenger:
Max Mustermann
Phone number:
012345678
29.00 €
Your bus trip generates 41.4 kg CO2 emissions. These emissions can be offset at a cost of 0.74€. 
Due to a campaign, we support your contribution to climate protection during this trip and we will 
increase, at our expenses, the amount you offset by 1/3. For each kilogram you compensate we will 
additionally compensate 1/3 kg CO2. As a result, 55.2 kg instead of 41.4 kg CO2 will be offset. 
Do you want to take part in the campaign and offset your emissions for 0.74€?
CO2 COMPENSATION
Additional information Yes No  
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Figure A3: Share of compensated bookings in % 
Note: The first bar represents the share of compensated bookings for the first booking decision only. The second striped bar depicts the data 
for all booking decisions. 
Figure A4: Customers’ contributions (net of incentive costs) 
Note: The first bar represents customers’ net contributions bookings for the first booking decision only. The second striped bar depicts the 
data for all booking decisions. 
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Figure A5: Share of compensated bookings for different amounts of CO2 
excluding matches amounts: 
 
including matched amounts: 
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